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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal decentralisation is seen as a means to enhance the economic efficiency of 
the government and also promote economic growth. Fiscal decentralisation is the 
empowerment of fiscal responsibilities to the sub-national governments, involving 
devolution of powers to tax and spend along with arrangements for correcting the 
imbalances between resources and obligations. The effectiveness of fiscal 
decentralisation depends upon: (a) appropriate expenditure assignments—with division of 
functions among different levels of government depending upon their comparative 
advantage (called the principle of subsidiarity); (b) appropriate tax or revenue 
assignments; and (c) the efficient design of a system of transfers and its proper 
implementation [Kardar (2006)].  
Many developing countries are turning to different forms of fiscal 
decentralisation because it is a possible way to get rid of the traps of ineffective and 
inefficient governance, macroeconomic instability and inadequate economic growth. 
Economists and policy-makers are of the view that the decentralisation of a nation’s 
fiscal structure is an effective strategy to promote economic growth and 
development. However, it is surprising that some existing studies found negative 
association between economic growth and fiscal decentralisation in cross country 
study as well as a country case study. In spite of this negative association between 
economic growth and fiscal decentralisation, developed and developing countries are 
reviving their debates on fiscal decentralisation.  
The primary propose of this study is to analyse the impact of fiscal decentralisation 
on economic growth of Pakistan. The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 
II will take brief review of previous studies on the subject. In Section III, we will 
summarise the trends in fiscal allocation between central and provincial governments. 
Section IV will describe the model and methodology. Estimation results will be presented 
in Section V. Section VI will conclude the study.      
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is extensive literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth. Different studies found different results for developing as well as 
developed countries but no study found on the same relationship in the context of 
Pakistan. Phillips and Woller (1997) suggested that there exists a statistically significant 
though trivial inverse relationship between the level of revenue decentralisation and 
economic growth in sample of developed countries. They failed to find any relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in sample of less developed 
countries. Their data set consists of annual observations on twenty-three less developed 
and seventeen developed countries for the years 1974 through 1991. 
Zhang and Zou (1998) using the provincial panel data for the period 1978-1992 for 
China, found that a higher degree of fiscal decentralisation of government spending is 
associated with lower provincial economic growth over the past fifteen years. This 
consistently significant and robust result in their empirical examinations is surprising in 
light of the argument that fiscal decentralisation usually makes a positive contribution to 
local economic growth. 
Jin and Zou used the panel data set for China’s 30 provinces for the time period 
from 1979 to 1993 and 1994 to 1999 separately. The results suggested that in both time 
periods, expenditure and revenue decentralisation levels should further diverge to benefit 
provincial growth. 
Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) found for the high-income country United States 
(covering the period since 1949) a highly insignificant effect of fiscal decentralisation on 
economic growth. They argue that the degree of fiscal decentralisation in this country may be 
at an optimal level so that benefits from a further rise of fiscal decentralisation are unlikely. 
Lin and Liu (2000) used the province-level panel data of 28 provinces of China for 
the period 1970-1993. They examined the effect of fiscal decentralisation on economic 
growth by using a production-function-based regression analysis framework. They 
suggested that fiscal decentralisation has made a positive contribution to growth process. 
They also concluded that rural reform, the non-state sector and capital accumulation 
along with fiscal reform are the key deriving forces of China’s impressive growth over 
the past 20 or so years. 
Thieben (2001) reviewed the benefits and shortcomings of fiscal decentralisation 
for OECD countries for the period of 1975–1995. He used the pure cross-sectional 
technique for analysis. He concluded that there is no relationship between economic 
performance of high-income OECD countries and reliance of sub-national governments 
on own revenue sources to finance their expenditures. Although it appears that increasing 
self-reliance and capital formation are positively related, the associations between self-
reliance, on the one hand, and TFP growth and economic growth, on the other, are 
unclear. 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001) concluded that it is still an open question 
for empirical search for a direct relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth. Much less attention has been devoted in the literature to the indirect 
channels through which fiscal decentralisation may effect economic growth, through the 
impact of fiscal decentralisation on economic efficiency, the regional distribution of 
resources, and macroeconomic stability. 
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Ebel and Yilmaz discussed the topic of measurement of decentralisation and 
different models on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth. Discussing the fiscal designs of OECD countries, they concluded that 
decentralisation is surprisingly difficult to estimate and data, used by different authors, in 
spite of many merits, falls short of providing full picture of fiscal decentralisation. 
Mello and Barenstein (2001) used the cross-country data for up to 78 countries for 
the period 1980-1992 and concluded that the higher the share in total sub-national 
revenues of non-tax revenues and grants and transfers from higher levels of government, 
the stronger the association between decentralisation and governance.      
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) using panel data set for 52 developing and 
developed countries for the period 1972-1997, examined the direct and indirect relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth and macroeconomic stability. They 
found that decentralisation appears to reduce the rate of inflation in the sample countries, 
does not appear to directly influence economic growth, and has an indirect, positive effect 
on growth through its positive influence on macroeconomic stability. 
Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) give an empirical examination of the impact of fiscal 
and economic decentralisation in China on the country’s economic growth and inflation, 
using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model with latent variables. Their econometric 
investigation offers strong evidence that there is a connection between decentralisation 
and macroeconomic performance in China. Economic decentralisation appears to be 
positively related to growth in real output for the entire postwar period in China. Fiscal 
decentralisation seems to have adverse implications for the rate of inflation, especially 
after the late 1970s. Decentralisation would therefore seem to be good for growth and bad 
for price stability. 
 
III. TRENDS IN FISCAL ALLOCATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS IN PAKISTAN 
(a) Overall Fiscal Status 
We analyse the fiscal stance of Pakistan which has two sides to balance the budget, 
namely revenues and expenditures. Fig. 1 shows that total expenditures accounted for 
25.7 percent of GDP in 1990-91 compared to 17.6 percent of GDP in 2005-06. Total 
expenditure in the National Accounts is divided into current and development 
expenditures (as in Fig. 1). Throughout 1990s’ current expenditures have a lion’s share of 
total expenditures i.e. 19.3 percent in 1990-91 and 16.5 percent in 1999-00. Current 
expenditures have decreasing trend now i.e. 16.3 percent in 2002-03 compared to 13.4 
percent in 2005-06. Although the change is not much significant but it is a positive start 
which should be continued. Development expenditures decreased consistently during 
1992–2001 from 5.7 percent in 1992–93 to 1.7 percent in 2000-01 and then increased 
during 2001-2006 from 1.7 percent in 2000-01 to 4.2 percent in 2005-06. This shows the 
overall Government expenditures as a share of GDP. 
Total revenues are divided into two tax revenues and non-tax revenues. Total 
revenues are 16.9 percent of GDP in 1990-91 and 14.2 percent in 2005-06 (as shown in 
Fig. 2). There is no significant increase or decline in revenues. Tax and non-tax revenues 
have also insignificant fluctuations. 
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Fig. 1. Share of Expenditures Relative to the GDP 
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Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
Fig. 2. Share of Revenues Relative to the GDP 
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Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
(b) Relative Fiscal Status between the Central and Provincial Governments 
Fiscal decentralisation can be measured by the relative sizes of central spending 
and revenue collection and provincial spending and revenue collection. Pakistan has a 
highly centralised structure, characterised by the constitutional assignment of powers and 
the political, administration and fiscal systems [Kardar (2006)]. The Constitution of 
Pakistan gives the power to the Federal Government to levy the most productive taxes 
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under present conditions-taxes on non-agricultural incomes, taxes on import, production 
or excise duties and sales taxes. Once collected, these taxes are then shared between the 
federal government and the provinces and between the provinces and local governments 
while the expenditure responsibilities are assigned to the sub-national governments. So, 
the revenue side is not a good indicator of decentralisation compared to expenditure side.  
Revenues are allocated between Federal and Provincial governments with help of    
National Finance Commission which is formed by the President of Pakistan after every 
five years. Since 1997, the share of the Government in the divisible pool has been fixed at 
62.5 percent while the share of the provincial governments has been fixed at 37.5 percent. 
Beginning 2006-07, the share of the provincial governments in the divisible pool will rise 
annually to 41.5 percent, 42.5 percent, 43.75 percent, 45.0 percent and 46.25 percent 
thereafter in coming years (Economic Survey, 2005-06). 
Fig. 3 shows some evidence about the relative fiscal status of central and 
provincial governments. In 1971-72, provincial governments had .29 percent of total 
federal government expenditures as compared to 43.62 percent in 2005-06. So, there is an 
increasing trend of fiscal decentralisation on the expenditure side. On the revenue side, 
29 percent in 1971-72 as compared to 44.73 percent in 2005-06. Although, it is 
increasing trend on the revenue side but still unsatisfactory. There are no significant 
changes in the ratio of expenditures and revenues which is poor picture of 
decentralisation of fiscal status from last 8 years in spite of increasing interest of present 
government towards fiscal decentralisation and devolution of powers.   
   
Fig. 3. Ratio of Provincial and Federal Expenditures and Revenues   
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Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL 
The present study is based on secondary source of data consisting annual 
observations on Pakistan and all four provinces for the period of 1971–2005. We have 
taken the real Gross Domestic Product at current factor cost as dependent proxy variable 
to analyse the impact of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth of Pakistan. Lin and 
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Liu (2000) also used same dependent variable for the analysis in their study on China. 
Data on GDP has been taken from Pakistan Economic Survey. Data for other variables 
has been taken from various sources i.e. Hand Book of Statistics on Pakistan economy, 
2005, various issues of Pakistan Economic Survey, Fifty Years of Pakistan Statistics.      
Fiscal decentralisation is measured with respect to both revenue and expenditure 
assignments. In the literature on fiscal decentralisation, different decentralisation 
measures have been used. These studies include Phillips and Woller (1997); Lin and Liu 
(2000); Mello and Barenstein (2001); Thieben (2001); Xie, Zou, and Davoodi (1999); 
Zhang and Zou (1998); Jin and Zou, Feltenstein and Iwata (2005). However, we have 
used the best known indicator of fiscal decentralisation.  
Our decentralisation variables are  
 RPEC: The ratio of sub-national government expenditures to total government 
expenditures;  
 RPECA: The ratio of sub-national government expenditures to total      government 
expenditures less defence expenditures and payment of interest on  debt; 
 RPRC: The ratio of sub-national government revenues to total government 
Revenues; and 
 RPRCA: The ratio of sub-national government revenues less grants-in-aid to Total 
government revenues.  
The variables RPEC and RPRC are straight forward measures of expenditure and 
revenue decentralisation. The use of these two ratios alone as measures of fiscal 
decentralisation, however, can be misleading [Phillips and Woller (1997)]. Confusion can 
occur when all or most local taxes, tax bases, and tax rates are established by the central 
government, when the central government exercises control over provincial expenditures, 
when grants-in-aid from the central to provincial governments are earmarked for specific 
purposes, or when defense and debt expenditures by the central government are taken into 
account as the case of Pakistan (presumably we want to include only those expenditures 
that could, in principle, be the responsibility of either level of government). Though we 
cannot account for all of the above difficulties, two simple adjustments are possible 
[Wasylenko (1987)]. The first adjustment in RPECA is to subtract defense and debt 
expenditures from total government expenditures when calculating the ratio of provincial 
government expenditures to total government expenditures. The second adjustment in 
RPRCA is to subtract grants-in-aid from provincial government revenues when calculating 
the ratio of provincial government revenues to total government revenues. 
Now, we explain our other explanatory variables. 
 OPEN: Openness, measured by the total volume of foreign trade (sum of exports and 
imports divided by GDP).  
 INFL: The inflation rate. 
 GEXP: Total govt. expenditures. 
 GREV: Total govt. revenues. 
We form our growth model as follows: 
Log(Y)=α1+α2Log(GEXP)+α3Log(GREV)+α4(OPEN)+α5(INFL)+α6(RPEC) 
+α7(RPRC)+α8(RPECA)+ α9(RPRCA)+µ i 
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Where, Y is GDP at current factor cost. Explanatory variables are explained above. 
Our explanatory variables (other than fiscal decentralisation variables) of growth used in 
many other studies on economic growth can be explained. The argument for including the 
degree of openness as a determinant of growth states that more exports lead to more 
efficient resource allocation as a result of external competition in the world market, 
whereas imports are the means to import advanced technology from developed 
economies [Zhang and Zou (1998)]. Inflation can generate a positive effect on growth 
because higher inflation leads people to invest more in physical capital and cut their real-
balance holdings (the Tobin portfolio-shift effect). But at the same time, inflation raises 
the transaction cost of economic activities (consumption and investment) and may reduce 
the rate of economic growth [Zhang and Zou (1998)]. To capture the impact of budgetary 
expenditures and revenues of central and provincial governments on economic growth, 
we have included the total govt. expenditures and revenues. However, our primary 
concern in this study is with fiscal decentralisation variables.    
In this study, first, we will check the stationary/non-stationary of variables using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with intercept and trend and intercept. If all 
variables will have the same integrating order, the co-integration analysis will be 
undertaken. If long-run relation will exist then model will be conducted by including the 
difference of lagged random error term. This model will be estimated based on OLS 
method. However, if variables are not going to co-integrate, then we will apply only OLS 
method with difference of the variables based on the ADF test. Moreover, the problem of 
autocorrelation is handled by using Autoregressive and moving averages methods of 
different orders.  
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
First of all, we have conducted the ADF test for stationarity or non-stationarity. 
Results of the mentioned test are reported in Table 1 and Table 2. Our dependent variable 
GDP time series is not stationary at 1st difference operator when we test it with intercept. 
It is also not stationary when tested with trend and intercept at 2nd difference operator as 
reported in Table 2.  We  have  found only Log (GREV) and OPEN time series stationary  
 
Table 1 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test with Intercept 
Variables Level 1st Difference Conclusion 
GDP 
Log (GEXP) 
Log (GREV) 
RPEC 
RPECA 
RPRC 
RPRCA 
INFL 
OPEN 
–2.07 
–3.39 
–4.07 
–2.61 
–1.2 
–2.15 
–1.28 
–2.92 
–5.92 
–4.12 
–5.32 
    – 
–8.95 
–5.56 
–5.96 
–5.32 
–4.93 
    – 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (0) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (0) 
Source: Authors calculations based on E-views software. 
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Table 2 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test with Trend and Intercept 
Variables Level 1st Difference Conclusion 
GDP 
Log (GEXP) 
Log (GREV) 
RPEC 
RPECA 
RPRC 
RPRCA 
INFL 
OPEN 
–3.78 
–2.57 
–2.56 
–3.43 
–3.53 
–3.12 
–2.24 
–3.44 
–5.43 
–6.37 
–6.85 
–8.36 
–9.22 
–5.46 
–5.90 
–5.22 
–4.81 
   – 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (1) 
I (0) 
Source: Authors calculations based on E-views software. 
 
when tested with intercept. But when we test Log (GREV) with trend and intercept, this 
time series found non-stationary. OPEN found stationary time series when tested with 
trend and intercept. So, the time series cannot be co-integrated due to unidentical 
conclusions from ADF test with intercept and with trend and intercept both. 
Our regression results are based on difference operator and we have used the first-order 
moving average process. The regression results are reported in Table 3. Results are not very 
much different from our expectations because we found positive association between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth except the ratio of provincial revenues to central 
government. Some studies surprisingly found the negative association between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth i.e. Zhang and Zou (1998), Phillips and Woller (1997) 
and Davoodi and Zou (1998). Our variables other than decentralisation are found significant 
except GEXP. In case of Government Expenditures, current expenditures comprising of 
expenditures for defence and debt payments, has a lion’s share in total expenditures in 
Pakistan.  So, it has not significant effect on economic growth of the country. INFL is highly 
significant and has positive impact on economic growth because higher inflation leads people 
to invest more in physical capital and cut their real balance holdings. GREV has also positive 
impact on economic growth and it is significant. OPEN has negative impact on economic 
growth. But our central focus is on fiscal decentralisation variables which are little surprising 
in their results. Ratio of provincial revenues to central revenues (RPRC) has negative 
association with economic growth of Pakistan in our sample period but when this ratio is 
adjusted (Provincial Revenues less Grants from federal government divided by Total 
Government Revenues), it has positive impact on economic growth and statistically 
significant. It is strong evidence for fiscal decentralisation on the revenue side. RPEC has also 
positive impact on economic growth and statistically significant which is also strong evidence 
for fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan. When we adjust this ratio to reduce the confusion which 
can occur when defence expenditures and debt payments are taken into account, the result is 
found statistically insignificant but has positive impact on economic growth just supporting 
the theory. Insignificant results are not surprising because some previous studies also found 
insignificant results especially for developing countries. For example, Phillips and Woller 
(1997) found statistically insignificant results for decentralisation variables, when they 
regressed these variables especially for developing countries. Our overall model is strongly 
supporting the evidence that fiscal decentralisation will lead to accelerate economic growth.                
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Table 3 
Regression Results with Gross Domestic Product as Regressand 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Constant 0.1123 0.0589 1.9061 
INFL 0.0066 0.0009 6.9543* 
∆ LGEXP 0.0886 0.0954 0.9285 
LGREV 0.0070 0.0031 2.2899** 
OPEN –0.4167 0.1793 –2.3241** 
∆ RPEC 0.5395 0.3746 1.4399 
∆ RPECA 0.1333 0.1119 1.1911 
∆ RPRC –0.1747 0.2714 –0.6437 
∆ RPRCA 0.6211 0.2690 2.3088** 
MA (1) –0.9895 0.0008 –1246.430 
R-squared                                          0.7448 Mean Dependent var.                        0.1459 
Adjusted R-squared                           0.6449 S. D. dependent var.                          0.0562 
S. E. of Regression                            0.0335   Akaike info. Criterion                      –3.7091   
Sum Squared resid.                           0.0258 Schwarz criterion                             –3.2557 
Log Likelihood                                71.2015 F-statistics                                       7.4571* 
Durbin-Watson stat.                          1.8054   Prob. (F-statistics)                             0.0000 
Source: Authors calculations based on E-views software. 
Note:  *, **, *** indicates that parameters are significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level 
respectively. 
 
R2 and F-statistic values are also reported in Table 3. So, overall impact of fiscal 
decentralisation variables and our other regressors on economic growth is near about 74 
percent which is supporting overall goodness of fit.    
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The main focus of this paper was to provide theory and evidence on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth for Pakistan. We have 
found mixed type of results i.e. some variables like RPEC,RPRCA have positive 
relationship and found significant but we have also found a coefficient (1.191) for 
variable RPECA which has positive impact on economic growth but statistically 
insignificant. We have also found a variable (RPRC) which has negative impact on 
economic growth. Perhaps, it is understandable at the this stage of development in 
Pakistan, where the central government is constantly constrained by the limited resources 
for public investment in national priorities such as highways, social services, poverty 
reduction, telecommunications, energy, defence, debt servicing etc. Such key 
infrastructure projects may have a far more significant impact on growth. This finding 
has some implications for Pakistan, pursuing fiscal decentralisation. The merits of fiscal 
decentralisation have to be measured relative to the existing revenue and expenditure 
assignments and the stage of economic development. The central government is in a 
better position to undertake the fiscal responsibilities at the early stage of economic 
development. However, if the shares of provincial government revenues and expenditures 
rise continuously then it can slow the pace of economic growth.   
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